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The study of European Union (EU) decision-making speed holds both
substantive and theoretical importance. Substantively, it helps identify which
factors produce or avert legislative paralysis, an insight that is a necessary
precondition for informed debate about potential EU institutional reforms.
Indeed, I entered this field in 1994 while at the European University Institute
in Florence to test whether the reforms contained in the famous 1987 Single
European Act (SEA) had unblocked and expedited legislation. Theoretically,
the study of EU decision-making speed helps us assess the utility of the tools
we use to understand the EU, such as coalition and spatial models that
emphasize formal rules, as well as deliberative and constructivist approaches
that privilege informal norms.
As more people gravitated to the study of EU decision-making speed,
survival analysis rightly became their method of choice. In a recent article
(Golub, 2007), I defended three claims about survival analysis and EU
decision-making: first, that all previous survival studies on the topic, includ-
ing two of my own, suffer from methodological problems that render their
findings unreliable; second, that researchers should apply a particular form
of survival analysis, a Cox model that accounts for state changes in the data
– by using time-varying covariates (TVCs) – and non-proportional covariate
effects; third, that we should apply this methodologically superior approach
to my 2002 TVC-coded data set of Directives.
The purpose of this forum was to subject my three claims to scrutiny and
identify ways to modify and extend them. Thomas König, the author of 
two studies I discuss in my article, was invited to defend his previous
methodological choices and to re-analyse his data in light of my criticisms
(König, 2008). My co-authored piece (Golub and Steunenberg, 2007) grew out
of Bernard Steunenberg’s recognition that time affects EU decision-making in
a more complicated manner than I had originally recognized. Christopher
Zorn (2007), in his contribution, draws particular attention to what he sees as
important, understudied temporal processes evident in duration dependence.
In this article I respond to arguments raised by König and Zorn, take stock
of what survival analysis has taught us about EU decision-making and discuss
where further research should focus. The first section identifies and reinforces
a number of uncontested points about survival analysis methodology and the
selection and coding of variables. Although these might appear to be esoteric
technical concerns, they have significant implications for determining what, if
anything, we actually know about EU decision-making speed and how to go
about learning more. The second section discusses four main issues for future
research: how to deal with non-proportional covariate effects, which cases to
count, whether to assign substantive meaning to duration dependence, and
how to isolate the effects of rules, preferences and enlargement.
Uncontested issues
The contributions to this forum reveal broad agreement on certain aspects of
survival methodology, several of the main factors that we expect to influence
decision-making speed and the hypothesized direction of their effect. Table 1
presents these uncontested issues. The first column identifies the five separate
methodological reasons I gave for previous survival studies being unreliable
and why we therefore need to ‘wipe the slate clean’ and why researchers
should employ a Cox model with TVCs and non-proportional covariate
effects (Golub, 2007: 161–5). Leading methodologists, including Zorn, have
made some of these same arguments (Zorn, 2007: fn8; Box-Steffensmeier 
and Zorn, 2001; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004), and König has never
disputed them.
To reinforce the point that a log-logistic model is inappropriate for EU
decision-making in general, and not just for my own data, I analysed König’s
online data set. Figure 1 presents four plots of the log-odds of survival
against the log of survival time – for König’s time-constant covariates instru-
ment type (i.e. Directives versus non-Directives), agriculture, trade and the
internal market. The appearance of straight lines can be misleading (Golub,
2007: 163), but an obvious deviation from parallel lines should lead us to
reject the log-logistic model (Collett, 2003: 226). The figure demonstrates that
the proportional log-odds assumption does not hold, so we can reject a log-
logistic model for König’s data. Moreover, since by definition the proportional
hazards assumption (or, for the log-logistic model, the proportional log-odds
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assumption) no longer holds when a model includes TVCs (Collett, 2003:
146, 253; Therneau and Grambsch, 2000: 127; Golub, 2007), if König were to
fix his data set and recode cases properly to reflect the enormous number of
state changes, especially the periodic shifts in member state preferences, it
would greatly exacerbate violations of the proportionality assumption and
render the log-logistic model even less appropriate.
The second column of Table 1 presents currently uncontested theoretical
issues. It identifies three basic factors that we all agree bear directly on
decision-making speed and our shared view of their hypothetical effects. In
short, formal voting rules, the formal powers of the European Parliament and
Council preference heterogeneity each affect the size of the core, the status
quo win-set and the proportion of winning coalitions, and changes to these
stability measures should directly affect decision-making speed (for details,
see Golub, 2007: 157–9).
Two key conclusions flow from all these uncontested points. First, much
of what we thought we knew about EU decision-making is unreliable since
it was derived from studies that applied the wrong survival methodology,
often to fundamentally miscoded data. Second, reliable findings about any
determinant of decision-making speed can be achieved only with data sets
Golub The Study of Decision-making Speed in the European Union 1 6 9
Table 1 Uncontested issues related to EU decision-making speed
Model choice and data treatment Theoretical determinants of speed
Parametric models: Formal voting rules: QMV shrinks the core, 
• require a prior theory about the enlarges the win-set, increases the 
baseline hazard proportion of winning coalitions and thus 
• have faulty diagnostics (e.g. expedites decisions
transformed survivor plots)
• involve the log-logistic which 
requires verification of the 
proportional log-odds assumption
All models: must accommodate non- Parliamentary involvement: cooperation 
proportional covariate effects and co-decision enlarge the core, shrink 
the win-set, decrease the proportion of 
winning coalitions and thus slow 
decision-making
All data sets: must code cases for Member state preferences: increasing 
state changes by using TVCs Council heterogeneity enlarges the core,
shrinks the win-set and thus slows
decision-making; decreasing Council
heterogeneity has the opposite effects
European Union Politics 9(1)1 7 0
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that code TVCs and models that accommodate non-proportional covariate
effects and adequately justify their treatment of the baseline hazard.
Issues for future research
Having reached agreement on some key aspects of model specification and
data coding, I see four key issues for future research. These are how to deal
with non-proportional covariate effects, which cases to count, what to make
of duration dependence exhibited by the baseline hazard rate, and how to
isolate the effects of rules, preferences and enlargement.
How should we deal with non-proportional covariate
effects?
As I noted (Golub, 2007: 164), and as Zorn (2007) reminded us in his 
comment, sometimes the coding of a covariate remains fixed over a case’s
lifetime, but the effect the covariate has on the likelihood a proposal will be
adopted changes with time. How should we handle these situations? In his
comment, König does not directly contest the need to deal with such non-
proportional covariate effects, but argues that doing so demands a pre-
existing theoretical foundation and that adding B*ln(t) terms to models of
EU decision-making may not adequately remedy proportionality violations
(König, 2008).
As a long-term goal, scholars should certainly seek to develop a satis-
factory theory about the precise nature of non-proportionality in various
covariates. But simply ignoring non-proportional effects while we await such
a theory does not improve the reliability of previous studies nor does it get
us any closer to the objective. Progress must follow the usual scientific
process of first identifying the phenomena and then trying to explain them
as best we can, through trial, error and incremental refinement. In our piece,
Steunenberg and I took a first step by discussing why the effects of some
covariates wear off or reverse direction. Naturally, though, we will need to
revisit our arguments in light of future research. Fortunately, we have formal
tests available to detect proportionality violations and interactive terms to
correct them (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Box-Steffensmeier and
Zorn, 2001). These were used in Golub (2007) and Golub and Steunenberg
(2007) to select B*ln(t) terms that proved superior to other options such as
B*t. The key point is that advances in theory will go hand in hand with the
development of new covariates that govern decision-making speed and
experimentation with alternative interaction terms.
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Which cases should we count?
A second important issue is which cases we should count if we want to draw
important inferences about EU decision-making. My view is that we should
focus on Directives, since the typical Directive is far more controversial and
significant than the typical Regulation or Decision. Counting the latter two
instrument types adds considerable background noise to the analysis. An
alternative approach, which König supports, is to gather a sample that is
representative of the full corpus of EU law.
Those inclined towards assembling a fully representative sample must
take care not to lump together the three instrument types. If instrument 
types are actually that different, then a properly specified survival model
would require a battery of interactive terms – of the sort Directive*QMV,
Regulation*QMV, etc. (Golub, 2007: 166). Neither of König’s survival studies
includes such terms, and, remarkably, the models reported in his most recent
study do not control for instrument type at all.
The ‘include everything’ approach is more of a liability than an asset
because a fully representative sample is useful only if you subscribe to the
far-fetched notion that there are no such things as trivial cases. Which cases,
then, should we exclude to improve the signal to noise ratio and obtain a
sample representative of significant proposals? König does not provide any
criteria for doing this, but he does contest my sampling strategy on the
grounds that Regulations, and perhaps even Decisions, are just as likely as
Directives to be classified as Council ‘B’-items in his data set. In other words,
if there is background noise (‘A’ points), König thinks it is spread evenly
across Directives, Regulations and Decisions.
As with instrument type, those inclined towards König’s view of
sampling will need to pay greater attention to model specification. All of
König’s studies lump together ‘A’ and ‘B’ proposals with no dummy variable,
let alone the necessary interactive terms to distinguish the unique effect of
each covariate on ‘B’ points.
There are powerful reasons, though, for simply ignoring the A/B distinc-
tion. Conceptually, it is simply not a proxy for controversy or significance. As
Hagemann and de Clerck-Sachsse (2007: 12) observe, ‘the records of “A” and
“B” points on the Council’s agenda do not in any way reflect the level of
disagreement or bargaining at the ministerial level’, since most proposals
eventually wind up as ‘A’ points by the end of a lengthy back-and-forth
process between the Committee of the Permanent Representatives
(COREPER) and the Council. What is surprising ‘is that “B” points have been
adopted at all’ (Hagemann and de Clerck-Sachsse, 2007: 12); having been
agreed prematurely, as it were, one could even argue that ‘B’ points are less
controversial than ‘A’ points.
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Much better proxies for a proposal’s level of significance and controversy
are how many rounds of COREPER meetings were needed, and, most obvi-
ously, how long it took before the proposal was either adopted or withdrawn.
The corpus of EU legislation is full of contentious proposals that are recorded
as ‘A’ points. Regulation 2003/150 on weapons importation taxes, for
example, was adopted after 15 years of negotiations. Likewise, there are
plenty of trivial proposals that were treated as ‘B’ points. Regulation 90/836,
for example, which extended the period of aid for skimmed milk processing
by two months, was adopted in three days. These are not just isolated
examples, they are symptomatic of the fact that status as an ‘A’ or ‘B’ point
tells us nothing about the inherent controversy or significance of a proposal.
As shown in Table 2, the typical ‘B’ point is just as trivial as the typical ‘A’
point, both requiring only three months of negotiations.
Instead of focusing on ‘B’ points and privileging thousands of cases such
as Regulation 90/836 while demoting thousands of cases such as Regulation
2003/150, the better strategy is to select all proposed Directives because they
are typically more controversial, as shown by the survival times in Table 2.
Having noted this huge disparity himself (Schulz and König, 2000: 660), it is
surprising that König does not address it in his contribution and continues
to ignore the implications for case selection.
König’s other objections to focusing on Directives are either wrong or
overstated. In his comment he contends that this strategy ignores the four
policy sectors of transport, trade, the budget and fisheries. In fact, Directives
were often used for transport, and not infrequently for trade. They were also
used for budgetary policy and, moreover, nearly all legislation in this field is
uninteresting from a survival standpoint because it is adopted yearly and
under a tight schedule. Fisheries presents the biggest problem, although
Directives did address support for fish life, control of fish disease and regu-
lation of fish-processing undertakings.
If we could identify the most important Regulations and Decisions in
various EU policy sectors, one way to improve upon my case selection
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Table 2 Days to adoption for Council ‘A’ and ‘B’ points in König’s data set
Regulations and 
All instruments decisions Directives
——————————— ——————————— ————————–——
‘A’ points ‘B’ points ‘A’ points ‘B’ points ‘A’ points ‘B’ points
Median 92 95 80 67 509 539
Mean 197 219 147 134 596 690
N 6644 1002 5899 848 745 154
method would be to add only these to my Directives data set while still
intentionally excluding the vast number of representative but trivial pro-
posals. But this might not be necessary since, arguably, you can generalize
from Directives to the universe of significant cases, which would include
Regulations such as 2003/150 that also took years to agree. The profile of
landmark fisheries Regulations also resembles that of Directives – Regulation
170/83 on the conservation and management of fishery resources took over
six years of negotiations, and Regulation 298/83 on multi-annual guidance
programmes took over three years.
Should we assign meaning to the baseline hazard?
No study to date has tried to interpret duration dependence evident from the
baseline hazard. Like many others, perhaps including König, I regard duration
dependence simply as a nuisance. Zorn disagrees. For him, efforts to under-
stand the shape of the baseline would constitute a big step along the path
towards more complete models of EU decision-making (Zorn, 2007: 572).
To support this view, Zorn offers a distinction between ‘spurious’ duration
dependence owing to unobserved heterogeneity and omitted covariates,
substantively interesting dependence caused by the propensity of the process
under study towards self-perpetuation (Zorn, 2007: 574; see also Zorn, 2000).
I find this distinction unhelpful, since ‘true’ duration dependence is merely
unobserved heterogeneity awaiting successful observation. If one were
capable of including all the relevant covariates in the model, the appearance
of duration dependence would vanish (Golub, 2008). Note that this is unlike
the situation where TVCs cause non-proportional covariate effects. With TVCs,
these effects – which we could also call variable-specific duration dependence
– will remain, regardless of how many variables we include (Golub, 2008).
Although some political scientists might ‘have tended to imbue duration
dependence with substantive importance’ (Zorn, 2000: 369), this produces
ambiguous claims. Consider the famous example of international rivalries
where the hazard of a rivalry ending rises over time. The theoretical interpret-
ation placed on this ‘true’ positive duration dependence is that rivals ‘tend
to wear themselves out and become more willing to settle their disputes over
time’ (Zorn, 2000: 369). But what does this suggestive phrase actually mean?
To have any substance, the twin phenomena ‘wear themselves out’ and
‘become more willing to settle’ must be observable and measurable, and 
thus amenable to inclusion in the model. Of course the same goes for non-
proportional covariate effects not caused by TVCs, discussed above, where
the eventual objective should be to observe and model why exactly the effects
of a covariate ‘wear off’ over time.
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Reaching this objective will be a long and complicated process, but the
best way to investigate duration dependence is to employ the particular type
of Cox Model I used in my article, since picking an erroneous parametric
shape, overlooking TVCs or ignoring non-proportional covariate effects will
produce incorrect inferences about the baseline (Zorn, 2000: 370; Golub, 2008).
Moreover, to address Zorn’s concerns about heterogeneity and potentially
different duration dependence within subsets of the data (Zorn, 2000; 2007:
570, 574), one could fit a Cox model with frailty or a stratified Cox model that
allows multiple baselines.
How do we isolate the effects of rules, preferences
and enlargement?
As mentioned earlier, there is broad agreement that decision-making speed
varies with formal voting and Parliamentary rules as well as with Council pref-
erences. Table 3 presents an overview of what we have learned from the various
survival analyses about these and other factors. It illustrates that our knowl-
edge is still quite limited and that considerable work remains. Cells marked
‘no data’ or ‘not coded’ indicate that a given study is silent about a particular
factor. More common is where a study has fitted the wrong sort of model to
miscoded data, rendering conclusions about a particular factor ‘unreliable’.
We know especially little about sector-specific decision-making speed, the
effects of member state preference heterogeneity and the interaction between
preferences and other covariates. In his comment, König reiterates some of
his previous claims about these issues, but they remain unreliable because he
did not take the opportunity this forum provided to fix his data and fit a more
appropriate model. Nor has he released his data on member state preferences
so other people could fix them. Even my recent studies offer quite limited
insight into individual policy areas; they show that legislation is adopted just
as quickly in new sectors as in traditional ones, but they do not investigate
distinctions between traditional sectors. Future work should rectify this.
As for member state preferences, my measures remain crude and indirect,
based on a series of dummy variables for four EU enlargements, three time
periods and the presence of one notoriously anti-EU political leader, Margaret
Thatcher. Party manifestos and Eurobarometer data offer more direct
measures of national preferences, but these indicators are useful only if coded
as TVCs, because they change with every government reshuffle and each new
survey. Ideally, preference TVCs should also code shifts that occur between
elections, as a result, for example, of the historic resolution of the budget crisis
in 1983, German reunification, the end of the cold war, agreement on the
Amsterdam or Nice treaties, or other notable events.
Golub The Study of Decision-making Speed in the European Union 1 7 5
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An even bigger long-term challenge is to distinguish between the effects
of different factors. For instance, changes to the core and changes to the
proportion of winning coalitions should both affect speed, so it will also be
necessary to retain EU enlargement dummies alongside better TVCs for
member state preferences. We must also retain time period dummies to
identify the presence or absence of ‘consensus’, since this norm has
supposedly operated throughout much of EU history, independent from
changes to Council heterogeneity.
Conclusion
As with any scientific endeavour, the only way to make progress in our under-
standing of EU decision-making is to learn from our previous mistakes and
try not to repeat them. This goes for the types of models we fit, the way we
code data and the theories we construct. The follow-up discussion of my
original EUP article has revealed important agreement on some of these
matters. Nobody contests that researchers must use data sets that employ
TVCs to code state changes, must not fit parametric models without adequate
justification and must not ignore non-proportional covariate effects. There is
also agreement that we expect formal QMV to speed decisions, and formal
involvement of the European Parliament as well as Council preference hetero-
geneity to slow them. These uncontested points have implications for how
we proceed in the four areas I have identified where there is less agreement
or where we have few reliable findings.
In the area of non-proportional covariate effects, I agree that interpreting
them is not straightforward and ascertaining their root cause is even trickier.
But at least we know that simply ignoring them produces unreliable results
and gets us no closer to a theory of decision-making processes. Steunenberg
and I have made a modest start, and a fuller picture will emerge with the
discovery of new covariates and better interactive terms.
In the area of case selection, I have argued for a narrow focus on Direc-
tives, augmented perhaps with the most important Regulations and Decisions
provided that these could be identified. Others might prefer König’s ‘include
everything’ approach, which aims for a sample representative of all EU
legislation, but if they, too, ignore TVCs, fit the wrong sort of survival model
and do not try to filter out background noise, this approach will produce
unreliable findings about trivial cases.
Much more work is needed to isolate the effects of rules, preferences and
EU enlargement. Progress will come mainly from the construction of better
TVCs that capture periodic shifts in member state preferences and terms that
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interact these preference TVCs with dummies for policy sectors, successive
enlargements and periods in which informal norms might have operated.
A final area where work might focus is understanding duration depen-
dence. I remain sceptical about trying to imbue duration dependence with
any substantive meaning but, for those who wish to do so, a Cox model with
TVCs and non-proportional covariate effects offers the best way to study the
baseline hazard.
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